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INTRODUCTION 
About the only thing that all of the Supreme Court Justices agreed upon in 
the recent Bush v. Gore1 decision was the proposition that, as a general rule, 
federal courts should defer to state courts on matters of state law. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, stated that “[i]n most cases, comity and respect for federalism 
compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law.”2 
The separate dissenting opinions contain similar language, with Justice 
Stevens calling such deference a “settled practice,”3 Justice Ginsburg 
 
 
 * Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Charles Hartsock Professor of Law, University of 
Cincinnati College of Law. I want to thank, but in no way implicate, Lonny Hoffman, Wendy Parker, 
Jim Repetti, and Michael Solimine for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I am grateful for 
the able research assistance provided by Jim Hart and Roger Neff. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 2. Id. at 112. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that this practice “reflects our understanding 
that the decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns. 
Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).” Id. See also 531 U.S. at 114 (“[W]e generally defer 
to state courts on the interpretation of state law.”) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
concurring). 
 3. Id. at 123 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
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labeling it the “ordinary practice,”4 and Justice Souter citing the Court’s 
“customary respect for state [court] interpretations of state law.”5 Indeed, the 
Justices differed only as to whether, as Justice Breyer put it in his dissent, 
“this case [was] one of the few in which we may lay that fundamental 
principle aside.”6 
But federal courts regularly lay aside this “fundamental principle” in tax 
cases. In literally dozens of areas, cutting across the federal income,7 estate,8 
gift,9 and generation-skipping10 taxes, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) 
incorporates state law rather than creating a federal rule to control the federal 
tax result. This creates a situation unique to the tax area in which a party 
obtains a state court decree on an issue of state law and later invokes the 
decree in federal court litigation involving a federal tax issue that turns on the 
application of that state law. The question thus is how much deference the 
federal court should give to the state court’s interpretation of state law. 
Unlike the situation in Bush v. Gore, where the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, most of the state 
court decisions at issue in subsequent federal tax litigation involve decisions 
of lower state courts. Yet the same principles of “comity and respect for 
federalism” support giving deference to lower state court interpretations of its 
own laws. In the parallel context of the Erie  doctrine,11 where the federal 
courts apply state substantive law for claims brought in federal court based 
solely on diversity jurisdiction, only decisions of the state’s highest court are 
binding on the federal court. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,12 the 
Supreme Court applied Erie principles in holding that federal courts must 
give “proper regard” to decisions of lower state courts in subsequent federal 
tax litigation. Although the Bosch “proper regard” standard in theory appears 
 
 
 4. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 5. Id. at 133 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 6. Id. at 148 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
 7. E.g., I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1994) (income tax deduction for ordinary and necessary business 
expenses disallowed for bribe, kickback, or other payment that is illegal under state law). 
 8. E.g., I.R.C. § 2053(a) (1994) (estate tax deduction for funeral expenses, administration 
expenses, claims against the estate, and unpaid mortgages permitted if these items are allowable by 
state law). 
 9. E.g., I.R.C. § 2514(d) (1994) (exercise of power of appointment to create another power of 
appointment is treated as a deemed gift for gift tax purposes if, under applicable state law, the second 
power can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any interest in the property subject to 
the first power for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first power). 
 10. E.g., I.R.C. § 2652(c) (1994) (person not treated as having interest in trust for generation-
skipping tax purposes merely because income or corpus of trust could be used to satisfy person’s 
obligation of support under state law). 
 11. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 12. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
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consistent with the Bush v. Gore deference principle, this Article 
demonstrates that federal courts in practice have given “no regard” to lower 
state court decisions by concluding in over one-half of the cases applying 
Bosch over the past thirty-four years that the state court judge had misapplied 
state law. The Article argues that the federal courts should return to the Erie 
roots of the “proper regard” test in order to give effect to the Bush v. Gore 
deference principle. 
Part I reviews the pre-Bosch confusion regarding how much deference 
federal courts should give to prior state court decisions in federal tax 
litigation. Federal courts used and advocated a wide variety of approaches 
during this period, none of which properly accommodated the underlying 
revenue and comity interests. Part I then turns to the Bosch decision and the 
original promise of the “proper regard” standard as a way to balance these 
competing concerns. 
Part II explains how in practice federal courts have converted this “proper 
regard” deference standard into a de novo standard of review. Over one 
thousand federal court cases have cited Bosch over the past thirty-four years, 
and courts in a clear majority of those cases in which the taxpayer was 
involved in prior state court litigation have refused to follow the state court’s 
interpretation of state law in the federal tax proceeding. As a result, the 
federal courts, in practice, have converted the “proper regard” standard into a 
license to give “no regard” to state court decisions on state law. 
Part III discusses the recent Bush v. Gore decision and argues that it is 
inconsistent with this “no regard” approach. The enormous interest generated 
by the Bush v. Gore decision makes this a particularly propitious time to re-
think this nettlesome question of federal tax law. 
Part IV argues that the Erie  doctrine provides the best vehicle for 
reconciling Bosch with Bush v. Gore. The complete-deference approach 
originally embraced by the Supreme Court and recently resurrected by 
commentators exalts the Bush v. Gore comity interest at the expense of the 
federal revenue interest. The nonadversary proceeding test adopted by the 
Internal Revenue Service (the Service) and commentators in recent years 
inevitably degenerates into a pointless inquiry into the requisite degree of 
adversariness necessary to make a lower state court decision on state law 
controlling in subsequent federal tax litigation. Procedural devices such as 
federal court certification of state law questions to state courts and joinder of 
the Service in the state court action also do not provide a workable solution 
to this intractable problem. This Article rejects the “no regard” approach in 
the existing case law and instead contends that a federal court should apply 
the same standard of review to a state court decision as would have been 
applied had the decision been appealed in the state court system. This 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“bottom-up” approach is consistent with recent cases and commentary on the 
Erie  doctrine. This revitalization of the “proper regard” standard allows 
federal courts to protect the federal revenue interest without undermining the 
comity concern by allowing state courts, in most situations, to be the final 
arbiter of state law. Only in the rare tax equivalent of the Bush v. Gore case 
should federal courts step in and overturn a state court’s application of state 
law. 
I. THE BOSCH STANDARD IN THEORY 
I have argued elsewhere13 that determination of the appropriate amount of 
deference that federal courts should give to prior state court decisions in tax 
litigation requires the balancing of competing revenue and comity 
concerns.14 Where the Code incorporates state law, there is a federal revenue 
interest in ensuring that the state law is correctly applied. This view led an 
early commentator to argue that federal courts should give no deference to 
state court interpretations of state law;15 however, a federal court has never 
explicitly adopted this approach.16 
In contrast, in 1916, the Supreme Court, concerned about the comity 
interest later highlighted in Bush v. Gore,17 gave complete deference to lower 
state court decisions in later federal tax litigation in Uterhart v. United 
States.18 Two decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue and 
balanced the revenue and comity interests through a focus on the nature of 
the state court proceeding. 
In Freuler v. Helvering19 and Blair v. Commissioner,20 the Court retreated 
from Uterhart and held that only “noncollusive” state court decisions were 
binding in later federal tax litigation. Unfortunately, neither Freuler nor Blair 
 
 
 13. Paul L. Caron, Bosch and the Allure of Adversariness, 64 TAX NOTES 673 (1994) 
[hereinafter Caron, The Allure of Adversariness]; Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions in 
Federal Tax Litigation:  Bosch, Erie, and Beyond , 71 OR. L. REV. 781, 785-87 (1992) [hereinafter 
Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions]. 
 14. For a criticism of this approach, see Bernard Wolfman, Bosch and the Erie Blind Alley, 64 
TAX NOTES 967 (1994). For my response, see Paul L. Caron, Tax Court and Service Stake Out 
Positions in State Law Debate, 71 TAX NOTES 229 (1996). 
 15. Michael H. Cardozo IV, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court 
Decisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783, 796-97 (1942). 
 16. Although I argue later in this Article that the federal courts in practice have come close to 
this approach in concluding in over one-half of the cases that the state court judge had misapplied state 
law. See infra notes 72-97 and accompanying text. 
 17. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 18. 240 U.S. 598 (1916). 
 19. 291 U.S. 35 (1934). 
 20. 300 U.S. 5 (1937). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/2
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set forth a detailed list of factors that would make a state court proceeding 
sufficiently “collusive” to enable a federal court to substitute its own view of 
state law for that of the state court. The result was thirty years of confusion in 
the lower federal courts as they struggled to define “collusion.” 
After initially equating collusion with fraud,21 many courts subsequently 
permitted federal courts to re-examine state court interpretations of state law 
that were the product of nonadversary proceedings.22 But the courts again did 
not agree on the factors to be used in making this determination.23 For 
example, in some cases,24 but not others,25 the init iation of the state court 
action after commencement of the federal tax controversy was evidence of 
nonadversariness. Similarly, the lack of notice to the Service of the state 
court proceeding sometimes,26 but not always,27 supported a finding of 
nonadversariness. Other federal courts focused on such factors as the lack of 
briefing or a hearing in the state court,28 or the failure to call witnesses or to 
conduct cross-examination.29 
The federal courts thus were mired in confusion. Neither the no-deference 
 
 
 21. See Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223-25 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc). See also  Estate of 
Darlington v. Comm’r, 302 F.2d 693, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1962); Eisenmenger v. Comm’r, 145 F.2d 103, 
106-07 (8th Cir. 1944); Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 970, 978-81 (W.D. 
Mich. 1964), rev’d, 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 22. See, e.g., Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1966); 
Estate of Pierpont v. United States, 336 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied , 380 U.S. 908 
(1965); Estate of Peyton v. Comm’r, 323 F.2d 438, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1963); Saulsbury v. United States, 
199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied , 345 U.S. 906 (1953). 
 23. Commentators were similarly unsuccessful. See, e.g., Robert C. Bartlett, The Impact of State 
Law on Federal Income Taxation, 25 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 103 (1947); Edmond N. Cahn, Local Law in 
Federal Taxation , 52 YALE L.J. 799 (1943); Covey T. Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of 
State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 CAL. L. REV. 638 (1953); Richard B. Stephens & James J. 
Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. 
REV. 223 (1961); Paul A. Teschner, State Court Decisions, Federal Taxation, and the Commissioner's 
Wonderland: The Need for Prelim inary Characterization, 41 TAXES 98 (1963); Note, The Role of 
State Law in Federal Tax Determinations, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1959). 
 24. See, e.g., Estate of Darlington v. Comm’r, 302 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1962); Estate of 
Stallworth v. Comm’r, 260 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1958); Estate of Sweet v. Comm’r, 234 F.2d 401, 
404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956). 
 25. See, e.g., Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 8 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 38 
(1934). 
 26. See, e.g., Estate of Peyton v. Comm’r, 323 F.2d 438, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of 
Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231, 232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962). 
 27. See, e.g., Estate of Farish v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 220, 229 (S.D. Tex. 1964), aff’d , 360 
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 28. See, e.g., Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1966); 
Estate of Pierpont v. Comm’r, 336 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied , 380 U.S. 908 (1965); 
Estate of Darlington v. Comm’r, 302 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1962); Estate of Faulkerson v. United 
States, 301 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962). 
 29. See, e.g., Estate of Peyton v. Comm’r, 323 F.2d 438, 440 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of Rainger v. 
Comm’r, 12 T.C. 483, 496 (1949), aff’d per curiam, 183 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1950). 
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nor the complete-deference approaches permitted consideration of both the 
revenue and the comity interests. Although the nonadversarial approach in 
theory purported to balance these interests, in practice it degenerated into 
confusion over the appropriate indicia of nonadversariness. The Supreme 
Court took another stab at clearing up the confusion in Commissioner v. 
Estate of Bosch.30 
The Bosch case involved the validity under state law of a wife’s inter 
vivos partial release of a testamentary general power of appointment, which 
converted it into a special power of appointment.31 If the release was invalid 
under state law, the husband’s estate would get the benefit of the marital 
deduction because the wife would have received a life estate coupled with a 
general power of appointment.32 But if the release was valid under state law, 
the husband’s estate would not get the benefit of the marital deduction. While 
the case was pending in Tax Court, the executor of husband’s estate obtained 
a state court ruling that the release was invalid under state law.33 The 
question thus was whether the federal courts should defer to this state court 
ruling. 
The Tax Court characterized the lower federal courts’ approach after 
Freuler and Blair as “highly confusing” and refused “to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of all of the cases in this field and to attempt to find a 
rationalization among them which the appellate courts themselves have been 
unable satisfactorily to do.”34 Although the Tax Court did not consider itself 
“bound” by the state court decision, the Tax Court “accept[ed]” the 
decision.35 
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed. The majority held that because 
there was no evidence of fraud, the state court litigation conclusively 
established the state law issue for federal tax purposes.36 Judge Friendly 
 
 
 30. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
 31. Id. at 457-58. Prior to the release, the power was a general power of appointment because a 
wife could exercise it on behalf of anyone she wished (including herself, her creditors, her estate, or 
the creditors of her estate). After the release, the power was a special power of appointment because 
she no longer could exercise it on behalf of herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her 
estate. 
 32. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1994). 
 33. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1966), rev’d, 387 U.S. 456 
(1967). According to the state court, a donee of a power of appointment could not release the power 
under state law if the donee was unable to exercise the power at that time. Because the power was a 
testamentary power of appointment, the state court held that a wife’s release of the power in an inter 
vivos instrument was invalid. See id. at 1011-12 n.3 (reprinting entire state court opinion).  
 34. Estate of Bosch v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 120, 122-23 (1964), aff’d, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966), 
rev’d, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
 35. Id. at 124. 
 36. 363 F.2d at 1014. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/2
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dissented, chastising the Supreme Court for not having addressed this 
“important problem” for nearly thirty years.37 He noted that the “cryptic 
character” of the Court’s “dated pronouncements” had caused widespread 
confusion in the circuits over this “intractable” problem.38 Judge Friendly 
stated that the problem had been “bedeviled by iteration of terms such as 
‘collusive’ or ‘non-adversarial.’ To require proof of collusion in the normal 
sense of prearrangement would impose a nigh impossible burden on the 
Commissioner; yet a court shrinks from using such an opprobrious epithet 
when no prearrangement has been shown.”39 Judge Friendly rejected the 
majority’s use of fraud as the only circumstance empowering a federal court 
to disregard a state court’s interpretation of state law.40 Instead, Judge 
Friendly disregarded the state court decision under the nonadversary 
proceeding test because the “state court litigation ha[d] been brought 
primarily to have an effect on federal taxes” and “the state court ha[d] not 
had the benefit of a fair presentation of both sides of the controversy.”41 After 
citing various nonadversariness factors,42 Judge Friendly concluded that 
“what makes this case so easy is that the state court proceeding had no 
significant purpose other than the reduction of tax liability.”43 After a de 
novo review of state law, Judge Friendly concluded that the state court judge 
had misapplied state law.44 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the “widespread conflict 
among the circuits.”45 In its brief, the Service argued that the Court should 
adopt the nonadversary proceeding test to balance the competing revenue and 
comity interests.46 According to the Service, permitting federal courts to re-
examine a state court’s interpretation of state law only in the case of fraud 
slights the revenue interest; federal courts would have “too narrow” a role if 
taxpayers could arm themselves with a state court ruling on state law and, in 
the absence of fraud, “eliminate the role of the federal courts in adjudicating 
federal tax controversies.”47 Conversely, the Service argued that embracing a 
 
 
 37. Id. at 1015 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1018. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1016. 
 42. Id. at 1017-18. 
 43. Id. at 1018. According to Judge Friendly, the state court decision was “devoid of any effect 
except on taxes.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 1016-18 (subsequent state court cases confirmed that the enactment of state statute 
overruled prior decisions supporting the view that donee could not release testamentary power of 
appointment prior to donor’s death). 
 45. 387 U.S. at 457. 
 46. Petitioner’s Brief, Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch , 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (No. 673). 
 47. Id. at 15. 
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pure Erie  approach would implicate comity concerns; federal courts would 
have “too broad” a role if a taxpayer would have to press his state law 
position “to the highest State appellate court if he is to foreclose the 
possibility that a federal court will tax him as if he had lost the State 
proceeding.”48 Instead, the Service argued that the federal courts should be 
permitted to re-examine the state law issue where the lower state court 
decision was the product of a nonadversary proceeding.49 The executor 
contended that this nonadversariness standard was administratively 
unworkable and would violate the comity concern by permitting 
“unnecessary intrusions” by federal courts into state court determinations of 
state law.50 
Justice Clark, writing for six members of the Court, rejected both fraud 
and nonadversariness as the trigger for a federal court’s re-examination of a 
state court’s interpretation of state law. The majority instead seized on a 
statement in the legislative history of the marital deduction at issue in the 
case that “‘proper regard,’ not finality, ‘should be given to interpretations of 
the will’ by state courts.”51 The majority also quoted the portion of the 
legislative history that required the state court interpretation to be the product 
of “a bona fide adversary proceeding.”52 But in offering general guidance on 
the question of the degree of deference that federal courts must give to state 
court interpretations of state law in subsequent federal tax litigation, the 
majority made clear that “proper regard,” and not nonadversariness, would 
be the future touchstone: 
[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by 
an intermediate state appellate court ruling. It follows here then, that 
when the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a 
state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori 
not be controlling. This is but an application of the rule in Erie, where 
state law as announced by the highest court of a state is to be followed. 
This is not a diversity case but the same principles may be applied for 
the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is 
based on state law and the State’s highest court is the best authority on 
its own law. If there be no decision by that court then federal 
authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving 
 
 
 48. Id. at 10-11. 
 49. Id. at 33 (“[A]ll of the parties [were] arrayed on the same side of the issue and urging the 
same result”). 
 50. Brief for the Respondent at 5-8, Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch , 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (No. 673). 
 51. 387 U.S. at 464 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1013, at 4 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 331, 334). 
 52. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/2
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“proper regard” to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this 
respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court.53 
The Court remanded the case to allow the Second Circuit to determine 
whether the wife’s partial release was valid under state law, after giving 
“proper regard” to the lower state court’s decision.54 However, the Court did 
not provide any guidance on the meaning of the term “proper regard.” 
There were three separate dissenting opinions in Bosch.55 Justice Douglas 
argued that, absent fraud, lower state court decisions on state law should 
control subsequent federal tax litigation. 56 In a lengthy dissenting opinion, 
Justice Harlan embraced the Service’s proposed nonadversary proceeding 
test as the appropriate way to balance the competing revenue and comity 
concerns.57 Justice Harlan’s dissent provides the intellectual foundation for 
the Service’s current position on the appropriate deference to be given by 
federal courts to state court decisions on state law as well as for 
commentators who advocate abandonment of the majority’s “proper regard” 
approach. 
Justice Harlan noted at the outset of his dissent that the question of the 
weight to be given a state court decision in subsequent federal tax litigation 
was “doubly important: it is a difficult and intensely practical problem, and it 
involves basic questions of the proper relationship in this context between the 
state and federal judicial systems.”58 In federal question cases such as tax, as 
with diversity cases, he stated that lower state court decisions should not be 
treated as conclusive statements of state law.59 However, Justice Harlan 
questioned whether the Erie framework “is necessarily applicable without 
modification in all situations in which federal courts must ascertain state 
law.”60 Justice Harlan contended that the Erie framework provided only 
“relevant guidance” where the legal and factual circumstances before the 
 
 
 53. Id. at 465 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. at 466. 
 55. Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 471 (Harlan & Fortas, JJ., dissenting), 483 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 57. Justice Harlan also criticized the majority’s focus on the “proper regard” language in the 
legislative history of the marital deduction at the expense of the “bona fide adversary proceeding” 
language. Id. at 475 n.3. Justice Harlan contended that this language was “broadly consistent with 
virtually any resolution of these issues, but it is difficult to see the pertinence of the sentence's last four 
words if, as the Court suggests, conclusiveness was intended to be given to the State's highest court, 
but to none other.” Id.  
 58. Id. at 471. 
 59. Id. at 476. 
 60. Id. at 477. 
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federal court were identical as those before the state court.61 
Justice Harlan argued that neither Justice Douglas’s fraud standard nor 
the majority’s “proper regard” standard “satisfactorily reconciles the relevant 
factors involved.”62 The fraud standard slighted the revenue interest because 
it created  
excessive risks that federal taxation will be evaded through the 
acquisition of inadequately considered judgments from lower state 
courts . . . brought, in reality, not to resolve truly conflicting interests 
among the parties but rather as a predicate for gaining foreseeable tax 
advantages, and in which the point of view of the United States had 
never been presented or considered.63  
The “proper regard” standard slighted the comity concern because it 
required “federal intervention into the administration of state law far more 
frequently than the federal interests here demand,” thereby destroying both 
“the proper relationship between state and federal law and . . . the uniformity 
of the administration of law within a State.”64 
Instead, Justice Harlan identified the federal revenue interest as a narrow 
one: to obtain “a considered adjudication of the relevant state law issues.”65 
The federal revenue interest in such a “considered adjudication” could be 
satisfied through a lower state court’s decision if it was the product of an 
adversary proceeding.66 However, if the state court proceeding was 
nonadversarial, the revenue interest could be protected only through a federal 
court’s re-examination of state law.67 Although Justice Harlan did not “define 
with any particularity” the weight to be given to various factors in 
determining whether the state proceeding was adversarial, he did provide 
several illustrative factors. Justice Harlan conceded that this approach lacked 
the precision of Justice Douglas’s fraud approach and of the majority’s 
“proper regard” approach, but argued that it reflected “more faithfully than 
either of those resolutions the demands of our federal system and of the 
competing interests involved.”68 
In the third dissent, Justice Fortas agreed with Justice Harlan’s adoption 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 480. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 481. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 482. Justice Harlan contended that despite the “wide use” of the adversary test in the 
circuits, there was no evidence of “practical difficulties” in its application. Id. at 482 n.9. 
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of the nonadversary proceeding test and wrote separately to elaborate on the 
factors that determine the requisite degree of adversariness to render the state 
court’s decision controlling in subsequent federal tax litigation. 69 Justice 
Fortas agreed with the factors listed by the Tax Court.70 
On remand, the Second Circuit held that the highest state court would not 
have followed the probate court’s decision in Bosch and instead would have 
upheld the partial release of the general power of appointment.71 This 
decision presaged how the federal courts would apply the Bosch “proper 
regard” standard over the next thirty-four years. 
II. THE BOSCH STANDARD IN PRACTICE 
Over 1,000 federal court cases have cited Bosch since the Supreme Court 
handed down the decision in 1967.72 Courts in a clear majority (60%)73 of 
those cases in which the taxpayer was involved in prior state court litigation 
have refused to follow the state court’s interpretation of state law in the 
federal tax proceeding:74 
 
 
 69. Id. at 483 (Fortas, J., dissenting).  
 70. See id . at 483-84. These factors include: (i) whether state court had jurisdiction; (ii) whether 
state court’s determination is binding on parties; (iii) whether state court’s decisions had precedential 
value throughout state; (iv) whether Service had notice of state court proceeding and opportunity to 
participate; (v) whether state court “rendered a reasoned opinion and reached a deliberate conclusion;” 
(vi) whether state court decision had potentially offsetting adverse tax consequences to the parties; and 
(vii) whether state court decision authoritatively determined future property rights). Id. at 484 (Fortas, 
J., dissenting). 
 71. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 382 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam). 
 72. The results of this empirical research must be interpreted in light of the inherent limitations 
of such a focus on reported cases. See, e.g., Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions 
and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 17 (2000); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No -Citation 
Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify 
the Means of Secrecy? , 50 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1998); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify 
Judicial Decisions Pose a Threat? , 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of 
Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.  177 (1999); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable 
Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 
MICH . L. REV. 940 (1989). See also  infra  note 96 for a discussion of the impact of the “case-selection 
effect” on the empirical results reported in this Article. 
 73. The precise percentage of cases reaching this result probably is less important than the 
federal courts’ adoption of de novo review in the face of the “ proper regard” standard. This is true in 
part because of the relatively small number of relevant cases and the lack of a comparative yardstick of 
results in other areas in which a federal court must rule on the correctness of a state court’s application 
of state law in a case involving a party to the federal proceeding. 
 74. Remarkably, my earlier empirical study of the 1967-1991 period found the same sixty 
percent federal court rejection of state court rulings on state law. See Caron, The Role of State Court 
Decisions, supra note 13, at 824-32. The consistency of these results in both the 770 cases citing 
Bosch in the 1967-1991 period and the 328 cases citing Bosch in the 1992-2000 period supports the 
conclusion that the federal courts have transformed the Bosch “proper regard” standard into a “no 
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Bosch in the Federal Courts: 
1967-2000 
 
Court 
Cases 
Citing 
Bosch 
Tax Cases 
Citing 
Bosch 
Tax Cases 
Following State Court  
On State Law 
Tax Cases Not 
Following State Court  
On State Law 
Courts of Appeals 302 92 19 28 
District Courts 536 77 15 24 
Tax Court  260 260 35 53 
Total 1098 429 69 
40% 
105 
60% 
  
Of note in this compilation is the consistency with which all levels of 
federal courts have converted the Bosch “proper regard” test into a license to 
disregard the state court’s interpretation of state law. In over fifty percent of 
the cases in the courts of appeals (59.6%)75 as well as in the two tax trial 
courts76 (federal district court (61.5%)77 and Tax Court (60.2%)78), the 
 
 
regard” standard. 
 75. Scott v. Comm’r, 226 F.3d 871, 874-76 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of Rapp v. Comm’r, 140 F.3d 
1211, 1214-18 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of Kenly v. Comm’r, 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g  72 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1317-19 (1996); McDonald v. Comm’r, 114 F.3d 1194, 1997 WL 284819, at 7-8 
(9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Autin v. Comm’r, 109 F.3d 231, 233-36 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Robinson v. Comm’r, 70 F.3d 34, 37-38 (5th Cir. 1995); Estate of Carpenter v. Comm’r, 52 F.3d 1266, 
1270-74 (4th Cir. 1995); Burke v. United States, 994 F.2d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied , 510 
U.S. 990 (1993); Estate of Chagra v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1991) aff’g  60 T.C.M. (CCH) 
104, 107 (1990); Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1341-42 (5th Cir. 1989); Estate of Kraus v. 
Comm’r, 875 F.2d 597, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1989); Estate of Selby v. United States, 726 F.2d 643, 644-48 
(10th Cir. 1984); Estate of Foster v. Comm’r, 725 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’g 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 
679, 682 (1983); Estate of Newman v. Comm’r, 624 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980), aff’g  38 T.C.M. (CCH) 
898, 900-01 (1979); Lemle v. United States, 579 F.2d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 1978); Estate of Hamilton v. 
Comm’r, 577 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1978), aff’g  35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1609, 1613-14 (1976); Magavern v. 
United States, 550 F.2d 797, 800-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Wiles v. Comm’r, 
491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974), aff’g 59 T.C. 289, 295-97 (1972); In re Estate of Abely, 489 F.2d 1327, 
1328 (1st Cir. 1974); Greene v. United States, 476 F.2d 116, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1973); Risher v. United 
States, 465 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1972); Murrah v. Wiseman, 449 F.2d 187, 190 (10th Cir. 1971); Krakoff 
v. United States, 439 F.2d 1023, 1025-28 (6th Cir. 1971); Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d 429, 
435-36 (10th Cir. 1970); Cox v. United States, 421 F.2d 576, 577-83 (5th Cir. 1970); Sappington v. 
United States, 408 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1969), aff’g 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 12,514, at 87,337-38 (D. Md. 
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 876 (1969); Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 382 F.2d 295, 295 (2d Cir. 
1967) (per curiam). 
 76. There are no relevant decisions of the third tax trial court (the Claims Court). 
 77. Davies v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722-27 (D. Me. 2000); Estate of Starkey v. 
United States, 58 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948-55 (S.D. Ind. 1999), rev’d, 223 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Leavenworth Nat’l Bank v. United States, 1996 WL 225193, at 10 (D. Kan. 1996); Hall v. United 
States, 822 F. Supp. 470, 473-75 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev’d, 39 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994); Trent v. 
United States, 1990-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,008, at 84,212-14 (S.D. Ohio 1987), rev’d, 893 F.2d 
846 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990); Crawford v. Unit ed States, 1981-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 13,402, at 84,477-78 (D. Mass. 1981); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 78-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9767, at 85,590-92 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff’d mem., 633 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 
1980); Lemle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Magavern v. United States, 415 
F. Supp. 217, 219-21 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d , 550 F.2d 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 
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(1977); Estate of Horner v. United States, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,143, at 85,652-54 (S.D. 
Iowa 1976); Van Nuys v. United States, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,081, at 88,815 (C.D. Cal. 
1975); Thayn v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 245, 248-50 (D. Utah 1974); Folkerds v. United States, 
369 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-82 (N.D. Iowa 1973), rev’d, 494 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1974); Condon Nat’l 
Bank v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 755, 757-59 (D. Kan. 1972); Risher v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 
484, 487-88 (S.D. Ala.), aff’d, 465 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972); Greene v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 464, 
466-68 (E.D. Wis. 1971), aff’d , 476 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1973); Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 
1089, 1092-94 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff’d, 439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971); Murrah v. Wiseman, 1970-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 12,696, at 88,904 (W.D. Okla. 1970), aff’d , 449 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1971); 
Kasishke v. United States, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 12,597, at 84,922 (N.D. Okla. 1969), aff’d , 
426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970); Cox v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 145, 147 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 421 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970); Estate of Leggett v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 22, 
24-26 (W.D. Pa. 1968), rev’d, 418 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1969); Schmidt v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 
811, 813-16 (D. Kan. 1968); Sappington v. United States, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 12,514, at 
87,337-38 (D. Md. 1968), aff’d , 408 F.2d 817 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 396 U.S. 876 (1969); 
Underwood v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 389, 395-96 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
407 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1969).  
 78. Estate of Young v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 297, 300-06 (1998); Estate of Bond v. Comm’r, 104 
T.C. 652, 657 n.3 (1995); Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 451, 453-64 (1994); Robinson v. 
Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116, 128-34 (1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995); Hayes 
v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 593, 597-605 (1993); Estate of Bennett v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 42, 59-60 (1993); 
Estate of Fletcher v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 49, 54-60 (1990); Estate of Horne v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 100, 103-
10 (1988); Estate of Preisser v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 767, 769-71 (1988); Graham v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 
415, 419-23 (1982); Padre Island Thunderbird, Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 391, 395-99 (1979); Gordon v. 
Comm’r, 70 T.C. 525, 531 (1978); Estate of Kincade v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 247, 253-60 (1977); Estate 
of Draper v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 23, 32-33 (1975), rev’d, 536 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1976); Estate of Salter v. 
Comm’r, 63 T.C. 537, 541 (1975), rev’d, 545 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1977); Newhouse v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 
783, 790-91 (1972); Wiles v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 289, 295-97 (1972), aff’d mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Estate of Campbell v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 133, 137 (1972); Estate of Miller v. Comm’r, 58 
T.C. 699, 712 (1972); Estate of Rowan v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 633, 636-40 (1970); Estate of Lawler v. 
Comm’r, 52 T.C. 269, 276 (1969); Estate of Ahlstrom v. Comm’r, 52 T.C. 220, 224-31 (1969); Estate 
of Pangas v. Comm’r, 52 T.C. 99, 101-04 (1969); Estate of Lewis v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 684, 686-89 
(1968); Estate of Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2080, 2085-88 (1999); Estate of 
Horstmeier v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1940, 1942-45 (1999), aff’d sub nom., Scott v. Comm’r, 226 
F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of Kenly v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1319 (1996), aff’d 
mem., 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of Rapp v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1709, 1715-19 
(1996), aff’d , 140 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of Millikin v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3032, 
3036-37 (1995), vacated, 125 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Estate of Tenenbaum v. Comm’r, 69 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1787, 1788 (1995), rev’d, 112 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 1997); McDonald v. Comm’r, 68 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1400, 1408-09 (1994), aff’d mem., 114 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1997); Estate of McKay v. 
Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 279, 281-85 (1994); Estate of Simpson v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 
3062, 3063-3 to 3064 (1994); Estate of Carpenter v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2400, 2403-08 (1994), 
aff’d , 52 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 1995); Estate of DePaoli v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1493, 1497-98 
(1993), rev’d on other grounds, 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1995); Estate of Melville v. Comm’r, 66 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1076, 1081-84 (1993); Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2332, 2335-38 
(1993), rev’d, 98 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of Hedrick v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 249, 252-
54 (1992), rev’d mem., 30 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1994); Estate of Chagra v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 
104, 107 (1990), aff’d mem., 935 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1991); Estate of Cole v. Comm’r, 58 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 715, 718-27 (1989); Estate of Kraus v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 600, 603-04 (1988), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 875 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1989); Morris v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062, 1062-64 
(1987); Estate of Jakel v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 264, 265 (1987); Estate of Foster v. Comm’r, 45 
T.C.M. (CCH) 679, 682 (1983), aff’d, 725 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1984); Estate of Ashenhurst v. Comm’r, 
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 674-76 (1982); Garriss Inv. Corp. v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 396, 401-03 
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federal courts have refused to follow the state court’s interpretation of state 
law. In many of these cases, the federal courts have cavalierly disregarded 
the state court’s interest in being the final arbiter of laws within the sta te, 
characterizing state court decisions with which it disagreed as merely 
“another evidentiary factor”79 to consider or as an example of “judicial 
fiat.”80 One federal court brazenly noted “the very limited role that state trial 
court decisions may play in determining federal tax liability”81 and instead 
called upon federal courts “to reexamine de novo the state court decisions.”82 
Other courts emphasized that they were “free to differ” with the state court’s 
interpretation of state law83 and that to allow state court decisions to bind 
federal courts in later federal tax litigation “would subject the federal tax 
system to ‘the whim of the state courts.’”84 Another court characterized the 
“lesson” of Bosch as follows: the Service, “having been absent from the State 
court proceeding that established rights to the decedent’s property, is entitled 
to [have its] day in Federal court.”85 
In less than fifty percent of the cases did the courts of appeals (40.4%)86 
 
 
(1982); Estate of Newman v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 898, 900-01 (1979), aff’d mem., 624 F.2d 
1096 (5th Cir. 1980); Estate of Hamilton v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1609, 1613-15 (1976), aff’d 
mem., 577 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1978); Estate of Bath v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 493, 502-06 (1975); 
Robinson v. Comm’r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1140, 1142-43 (1974); Estate of Urge v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 275, 276-77 (1972); Estate of Goldstein v. Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1399, 1402-05 (1971), 
rev’d, 479 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1973); Kraus v. Comm’r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078, 1081 (1967). 
 79. Lake Shore Nat’l Bank v. Coyle, 296 F. Supp. 412, 418 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev’d, 419 F.2d 958 
(7th Cir. 1969). 
 80. Cox v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 145, 147 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
421 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 81. Hall v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 470, 474 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev’d, 39 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
 82. Id. at 475. 
 83. Leggett v. United States, 418 F.2d 1257, 1258 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 84. Burke v. United States, 994 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting Estate of Street, 974 F.2d 
723, 728 (6th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 990 (1993). 
 85. Estate of Kenly v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1319 (1996), aff’d mem., 139 F.3d 904 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
 86. See Estate of Starkey v. United States, 223 F.3d 694, 699-704 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of 
Davenport v. Comm’r, 184 F.3d 1176, 1182-85 (10th Cir. 1999); Neal v. United States, 187 F.3d 626 
(3d Cir. 1999), aff’g 1998 WL 718117, at 4-9 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Estate of Delaune v. United States, 143 
F.3d 995, 1000-04 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999); Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 
98 F.3d 919, 921-26 (6th Cir. 1996); Hall v. United States, 39 F.3d 102, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1994); Estate 
of Hedrick v. Comm’r, 30 F.3d 139, 1994 WL 409713, at 3-6 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table 
decision); Estate of Warren v. Comm’r, 981 F.2d 776, 779-84 (5th Cir. 1993); Griffith v. Comm’r, 749 
F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1984); Sun First Nat’l Bank v. United States, 607 F.2d 1347, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 
Estate of Salter v. Comm’r, 545 F.2d 494, 497-501 (5th Cir. 1977); Estate of Draper v. Comm’r, 536 
F.2d 944, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1976); Folkerds v. United States, 494 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 61-65 (8th Cir. 1973); Estate of Goldstein v. Comm’r, 479 F.2d 813, 
819 (10th Cir. 1973); Hatt v. Comm’r, 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); First Nat’l Bank v. 
United States, 422 F.2d 1385, 1387 (10th Cir. 1970); Estate of Leggett v. United States, 418 F.2d 
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and the tax trial courts (federal district court (38.5%)87 and Tax Court 
(39.8%)88) accept the state court’s view of its own state’s laws. Ultimately, 
the federal courts agreed with the state court only after a rigorous, de novo 
examination of state law. 
The language of these federal courts, whether ultimately rejecting or 
accepting the state court’s interpretation of state law, is striking in their 
disrespect for state courts.89 At best, the federal courts give mere lip service 
 
 
1257, 1258-61 (3d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Comm’r, 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); 
Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1969). 
 87. Estate of O’Neal v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215-18 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Neal v. 
United States, 1998 WL 718117, at 4-9 (W.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d mem., 187 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Estate of Stern v. United States, 1998 WL 172640, at 4-6 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Mervis Industries, Inc. v. 
Sams, 866 F. Supp. 1143, 1145-49 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Stansbury v. United States, 543 F. Supp. 154, 
156-58 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Provident Nat’l Bank v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 987, 988-92 (E.D. Pa. 
1980); Wheaton v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 972, 974-79 (D. Minn. 1979); United States v. Bosurgi, 
389 F. Supp. 1088, 1090-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 530 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 
1976); Endicott Trust Co. v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,111, at 88,936-39 
(N.D.N.Y. 1975); Miglionico v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 197, 200-01 (N.D. Ala. 1971); First Nat’l 
Bank of Amarillo v. United States, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 12,589, at 84,992-93 (D.N.M. 
1969), aff’d , 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1970); Ritter v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259, 1263-65 
(S.D.W. Va. 1968); Lake Shore Nat’l Bank v. Coyle, 296 F. Supp. 412, 416-20 (N.D. Ill. 1968); 
Kellmann v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 632, 634-37 (E.D. Mo. 1968); Rudin v. United States, 285 F. 
Supp. 901, 903-05 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
 88. Estate of Hubert v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 314, 318-22 (1993), aff’d on other grounds, 63 F.3d 
1083 (11th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 520 U.S. 93 (1997); Estate of Spruill v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1197, 1216-22 
(1987); Estate of Paxton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 785, 802-03 (1986); Estate of Fulmer v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 
302, 308 (1984); Mass v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 112, 123-28 (1983); Estate of Stewart v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 
1046, 1048-52 (1982); Estate of Weiskopf v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 135, 142-45 (1981); Estate of 
Greenberg v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 680, 684-87 (1981); Mann v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1249, 1259-62 (1980); 
Estate of Sawyer v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 1, 3-4 (1979); Harrah v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 735, 746-56 (1978); 
Tracy v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 397, 400-03 (1978); Estate of Craft v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 249, 264-69 (1977); 
Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 400, 406-13 (1974); Estate of Hamelsky v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 
741, 744-45 (1972); Harris v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 1165, 1177-79 (1971), rev’d, 477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 
1973); Willits v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 602, 617-18 (1968); Smith v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 273, 281-83 (1968), 
aff'd , 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Herman A. Moore Trust v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 430, 
440-41 (1968); Estate of Lassiter v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 541, 551-57 (2000); Steingold v. 
Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 95, 96 (2000); Estate of Davenport v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 405, 
410-12 (1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 1999); Estate of Baird v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1883, 1884-86 (1997); Estate of Street v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1787, 1788-89 (1997), aff’d on 
other grounds, 152 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1998); Zurn v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 440, 449-50 (1996); 
Wells v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1278, 1280-82 (1995); Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 123, 125-28 (1994), nonacq., 1996-1 C.B. 1, 1996-2 C.B. 1; Estate of Haydel v. Comm’r, 62 
T.C.M. (CCH) 956, 964 (1991); Estate of Henderson v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1332, 1336-39 
(1989); Griffith v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, 192 & n.5 (1983), aff'd , 749 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 
1984); Estate of Roberts v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101, 1103-04 (1983); Estate of Reichenberger 
v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1035, 1038-40 (1980); Estate of Rose v. Comm’r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 
461, 462-63 (1973); Estate of Aquilino v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 906, 907-08 (1972); Hatt v. 
Comm’r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194, 1199-1200 (1969), aff'd, 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
 89. This lack of respect is especially troubling given the evidence in the Erie context illustrating 
how often federal courts incorrectly gauge state law. See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, A Certification Rule 
for California , 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 935, 937-40 (1996); John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, 
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to the Bosch “proper regard” standard.90 In most cases, the federal courts 
engage in de novo review of state law without giving any weight to the state 
court decision.91 In addition, many federal courts also have reverted to a pre-
Bosch focus on the adversariness of the state court decision.92 For example, 
in Estate of Delaune v. United States93 the Fifth Circuit stated that where “the 
state court adjudication arises out of a manifestly non-adversarial proceeding 
and the relevant federal tax statute indicates no preference for the sanctity of 
the state court’s ruling, we need accord no particular deference, and must 
conduct our own investigation of the relevant state law.”94 In other cases, 
however, federal courts have noted that Bosch intended the “proper regard” 
test as a substitute for the nonadversary proceeding test.95 
This thirty-four year experience with Bosch demonstrates that the initial 
promise of the “proper regard” test as a way to balance the competing 
revenue and comity interests instead has given way to a one-sided focus on 
the revenue interest.96 The well-settled practice of federal courts giving “no 
 
 
Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 415 n.11 (1988); Dolores 
K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism , 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1671, 1679-80 (1992); Stella L. Smetanka, To Predict or to Certify Unresolved Questions of 
State Law: A Proposal for Federal Court Certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 68 TEMP . 
L. REV. 725, 729-35 (1995). See also  Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in its Place: Stare 
Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1996). Cf. Donald H. Zeigler, 
Gazing into the Crysta l Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain 
Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1999). 
 90. In some cases, federal courts of appeals have gone out of their way to applaud lower federal 
courts for construing state law differently than the state court, even where the federal court of appeals 
ultimately agrees with the state court’s interpretation of state law. See Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 98 
F.3d 919, 926 (6th Cir. 1996) (“We thus differ with the legal conclusion of the Tax Court, not with its 
method of review. The Tax Court gave ‘proper regard’ to the probate court decisions when it 
recounted and attempted to apply the same Ohio law. It simply did so in an incorrect manner.”). 
 91. In some cases, federal courts have followed a decision of a state’s intermediate appellate 
court on state law. See, e.g., Estate of Starkey v. Comm’r v. United States, 223 F.3d 694, 699-702 (7th 
Cir. 2000); Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 98 F.3d 919, 921-25 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 92. See, e.g., Robinson v. Comm’r, 70 F.3d 34, 37-38 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 824 
(1996); Estate of Warren v. Comm’r, 981 F.2d 776, 781-83 (5th Cir. 1993); Burke v. United States, 
994 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 990 (1993); Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 
1329, 1342-43 n.15 (5th Cir. 1989); Lemle v. United States, 579 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Leavenworth Nat’l Bank v. United States, 1996 WL 225193, at 10 (D. Kan. 1996); Estate of Bond v. 
Comm’r, 104 T.C. 652, 670 n.3 (1995); Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116, 132-33 (1994), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 824 (1996); Estate of Bennett v. 
Comm’r, 100 T.C. 42, 60 (1993); Estate of Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2080, 2088 
(1999); Estate of Simpson v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3062, 3063-4 to 3063-5 (1994). 
 93. 143 F.3d 995 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999). 
 94. Id. at 1002. 
 95. See, e.g., Keinath v. Comm’r, 480 F.2d 57, 62 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973); Trent v. United States, 
1990-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,008, at 84,213 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
 96. These results must be considered in light of the “case-selection effect,” which notes that 
litigated cases are not a random sample of the universe of such cases. Under this theory, cases reach 
trial only where the parties disagree over the likely outcome; cases where the legal rules favor one 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/2
p749 Caron.doc  2/28/2002   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] FEDERAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF BUSH V. GORE 765 
 
 
 
 
regard” to state court decisions on state law is inconsistent with the deference 
principle reaffirmed in the recent Bush v. Gore97 decision. 
III. THE IMPACT OF BUSH V. GORE 
In its December 12, 2000 decision that put an end to the five-week-long 
presidential election imbroglio, the Supreme Court split into three separate 
camps in an unsigned per curiam delivering the judgment of the Court 
accompanied by five separate opinions. About the only thing that all of the 
Justices agreed upon was the proposition that, as a general rule, federal courts 
should defer to state courts on matters of state law.98 On one side, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, stated that “[i]n most cases, comity and respect for federalism 
compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law.”99 
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Erie  in explaining that this practice “reflects 
our understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive 
pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns.”100 As a result, the 
federal courts “generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state 
 
 
party or the other are settled prior to trial. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do 
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction , 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical 
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, 
Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the Jury , 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (2000); Daniel Kessler et 
al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of 
Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996). As a result, even a pro-taxpayer legal standard 
would not result in a trial success rate much different than fifty percent because most such cases would 
be settled in the taxpayer’s favor; only the close questions on both sides of the standard would remain 
for trial. Although the taxpayer’s forty percent success rate in requiring the Service to follow a state 
court’s prior application of state law despite the Bosch “proper regard” standard would appear to 
support the case-selection effect thesis, the basic assumption of the case-selection effect theory 
undercuts its application here. The case-selection effect theory depends on the parties being able to 
predict the outcome of litigation under a legal standard in deciding whether or not to settle. However, 
as this Article has demonstrated, the Bosch standard has engendered thirty-four years of disarray, as 
the federal courts have read all meaning out of “proper regard.” By paying lip service to this standard, 
but then subjecting lower state court determinations of state law to de novo federal review, the federal 
courts have undermined the parties’ ability to correctly gauge the result of litigation. This is especially 
true in light of the federal courts’ sporadic reliance on the pre-Bosch nonadversary proceedings test 
and the uncertainty faced by the parties under both the Bosch standard and the separate state law issue. 
In these circumstances, the case-selection effect does not offer a convincing explanation for the results 
of the empirical research reported here. 
 97. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 98. Id. The Justices also agreed with this proposition in the unanimous per curiam opinion in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board , 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam) (“As a general 
rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state statute.”). 
 99. 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
 100. Id. (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).  
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law.”101 But the majority concluded that the extraordinary circumstances of 
the case warranted a departure from this general principle in holding that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s order requiring manual recounts under Florida 
election law violated federal equal protection guarantees.102 
On the other side, the separate dissenting opinions contain similar 
language endorsing the general desirability of federal court deference to state 
court interpretations of state law. Justice Stevens called such deference a 
“settled practice”103 and criticized the majority for its “unstated lack of 
confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges.”104 Justice 
Souter called Bush v. Gore a “straightforward” doctrinal case105 and chided 
the majority for cavalierly disregarding the Court’s “customary respect for 
state [court] interpretations of state law.”106 Justice Ginsburg noted that the 
“ordinary practice”107 of federal courts is to defer to state court 
interpretations of state law and that “disagreement with the Florida court’s 
interpretation of its own State’s laws” did not justify the majority’s 
substitution of its judgment for that of the state  court.108 Justice Ginsburg 
stated that “[i]n deferring to state courts on matters of state law, we 
appropriately recognize that this Court acts as an ‘outsider lacking the 
common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the 
jurisdiction.’”109 In perhaps the clearest expression of the general deference 
standard in all of the various opinions, Justice Ginsburg stated: “The 
extraordinary setting of this case has obscured the ordinary principle that 
dictates its proper resolution: Federal courts defer to state high courts’ 
interpretations of their state’s own laws. This principle reflects the core of 
federalism, on which all agree.”110 In the end, the Justices differed only as to 
whether, as Justice Breyer put it in his dissent, “this case [was] one of the few 
in which we may lay that fundamental principle aside.”111 
 
 
 101. Id. at 114. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 123 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). In his opinion dissenting from the 
grant of the application for a stay and from the grant of the writ of certiorari, Justice Stevens called this 
a “venerable [rule] of judicial restraint.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“On questions of state law, we have consistently respected the 
opinions of the highest courts of the States.”). 
 104. Id. at 128. 
 105. Id. at 129 (Souter, Stevens, Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 133. 
 107. Id. at 135 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 136. See also  id. (majority had no cause to upset state court’s “reasoned interpretation 
of Florida law”). 
 109. Id. at 138 (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)). 
 110. Id. at 142. 
 111. Id. at 148 (Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/2
p749 Caron.doc  2/28/2002   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] FEDERAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF BUSH V. GORE 767 
 
 
 
 
Whatever one’s view about the ultimate outcome in Bush v. Gore, run-of-
the-mill federal tax cases simply do not require the same level of federal 
intrusion into state court determinations of state law as the most hotly 
contested presidential election in a century. To be sure, most of the state 
court decisions at issue in subsequent federal tax litigation involve decisions 
of lower state courts rather than the decision of the highest state court at issue 
in Bush v. Gore. Yet the same principles of comity and federalism at the 
heart of Bush v. Gore support federal courts giving deference to a lower state 
court interpretations of its own laws. This notion is reflected in the language 
of the Justices’ separate opinions re-stating the deference principle in the 
broadest possible terms to encompass decisions of not only the highest state 
court but also lower state courts. 
Moreover, the enormous visibility of the Bush v. Gore decision makes 
this an especially propitious time to re-think this nettlesome aspect of federal 
tax law that has bedeviled courts and commentators for decades. With both 
the legal community and the public now more attuned to the comity issues 
implicated by federal judicial intervention into state court decision making,112 
federal courts no longer should be able to blithely convert the Bosch “proper 
regard” standard into a one-sided embrace of the federal revenue interest 
through their no regard approach. To that effect, there are various alternative 
ways to implement the Bush v. Gore deference principle, either within the 
existing Bosch framework or through an entirely new approach.113 
 
 
 112. See generally ALAN M .  DERSHOWITZ,  SUPREME INJUSTICE : HOW THE HIGH COURT 
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); E.J. DIONNE, JR. & WILLIAM KRISTOL, BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT 
CASES AND THE COMMENTARY (2001); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (2001); ROBERT M. JARVIS ET 
AL., BUSH V. GORE: THE FIGHT FOR FLORIDA’S VOTE  (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER,  BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK : THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Jack M. Balkin, 
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001); Craig M. 
Bradley, “Be Careful What You Ask For”: The 2000 Presidential Election, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76 IND. L.J.  889 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was 
Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush 
v. Gore, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 381 (2001); Lonny Hoffman, Federal Courts Law and the 2000 Presidential 
Election, 95 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens 
of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law 
Doesn’t Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 
(2001); Symposium: Bush v. Gore, 68 U .  CHI.  L.  REV. 613 (2001); Symposium: The Law of 
Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2001); Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling , WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A26. 
 113. Twelve years ago, the Supreme Court appeared on the verge of revisiting Bosch when it 
granted certiorari in White v. United States, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989). In White, a state probate court 
approved the payment of both an attorney’s fee and an executor’s commission to the same person. 
United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 905 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). In auditing the estate, the Service 
disallowed the claimed administration expense deduction for the fees and instituted a summons 
enforcement proceeding to obtain information about the fees (the attorney’s time records or an 
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IV. RECONCILING BOSCH WITH BUSH V. GORE 
There are several possibilities for injecting the Bush v. Gore comity 
concern back into the Bosch “proper regard” framework: (1) requiring 
federal courts to defer to all state court determinations of state law in 
subsequent federal tax litigation; (2) requiring federal courts to accept only 
state court determinations that are the product of an adversarial proceeding; 
or (3) using procedural devices such as certification and joinder. This section 
argues that none of these approaches adequately balances the competing 
concerns and that federal courts instead should return to the Erie 
underpinnings of the Bosch standard to give effect to the Bush v. Gore 
deference principle. 
A. Complete Deference 
As noted earlier,114 the Supreme Court when first faced with this issue in 
1916 held in Uterhart v. United States115 that state court decisions on state 
law are controlling in later federal tax litigation. Lower federal courts 
followed this complete-deference approach for two decades,116 until the 
Supreme Court in the 1930s held that only noncollusive state court decisions 
 
 
itemized list of legal work performed for the estate). Id. at 905-06. The district court refused to enforce 
the summons because it would not “second guess” the state court’s decision. Id. at 911. The Second 
Circuit reversed the decision and ordered the enforcement of the summonses because, under Bosch, the 
federal courts and the Service could reexamine the state court’s application of state law. United States 
v White, 853 F.2d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 1988). Although the Second Circuit questioned whether the 
Service was “allocating wisely the time and effort of its limited staff” in pursuing the matter, it 
concluded that the Service had a “legitimate purpose” for issuing the summonses to investigate the 
circumstances of the expenses. Id. at 117-18. The case thus involved the narrow context of a summons 
enforcement proceeding, but the estate in its certiorari petition cast the issue in broad Bosch terms as 
“the degree of deference owed by the federal tax authorities to determinations by state courts.” Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 4, White v. 
United Stat es (No. 88-928). After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, White v. United States, 489 
U.S. 1051 (1989), and heard oral arguments in the case, the Court, with Justice White dissenting, 
dismissed the writ of certiorari as having been “improvidently granted.” White v. United States, 493 
U.S. 5 (1989). The case apparently had become moot as the Service had obtained the information it 
requested in the summonses, and a year later the Service agreed to refund the entire amount of estate 
tax attributable to the disputed deductions. Consent to Judgment, White v. United States, No. 88-
0725T (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1990). See Paul L. Caron, Must an Administration Expense Allowed by 
State Law Also Meet a Federal Necessity Test? , 70 J. TAX’N 352 (1989); Marilyn E. Nelson, 
Deductibility for Estate Tax Purposes of Legal Fees and Administration Expenses, 30 TAX MGM’T. 
MEM. 287 (1989). 
 114. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 115. 240 U.S. 598 (1916). 
 116. See, e.g., Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 19 F.2d 454, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 
U.S. 565 (1927); Sutherland v. Selling, 16 F.2d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 760 
(1927); Hidden v. Durey, 34 F.2d 174, 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1929). 
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were binding in later federal tax proceedings.117 Gilbert Verbit has 
recommended that federal courts return to this complete-deference approach:  
This Uterhart rule should replace Bosch as the method of dealing with 
state court decisions in federal tax cases. In short, all final decisions of 
state courts should be accepted as binding in federal tax cases, 
regardless of the level of the state court or the character of the 
proceedings in that court.118 
The difficulty with this approach is that it exalts the Bush v. Gore comity 
interest at the expense of the legitimate federal interest in protecting federal 
revenues against aberrant manifestations of state law. Although Professor 
Verbit refuses to view state court judges as active participants in a “Great 
Treasury Raid,”119 requiring federal courts to give controlling weight to all 
state court decisions would eliminate any role for federal courts in ensuring 
the correctness of state court interpretations that control federal tax liability. 
Moreover, it would create an incentive for taxpayers to manufacture state 
court litigation in order to come within the protection of this rule.120 Instead, 
the question is how to afford meaningful federal supervision of state law 
without running afoul of the Bush v. Gore deference principle as is currently 
the case with the Bosch “proper regard” standard.  
B. Deference to State Court Adversarial Proceedings 
One possible solution, embraced by Justices Harlan and Fortas in their 
Bosch dissents,121 by some federal courts since then,122 and recently again by 
the Service123 is to give controlling weight to state court interpretations of 
state law only where the state court decision is the product of an adversarial 
proceeding. Bernard Wolfman124 and other commentators125 support this 
 
 
 117. Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler v. Comm’r, 291 U.S. 35 (1934). 
 118. Gilbert P. Verbit, State Court Decisions in Federal Transfer Tax Litigation: Bosch Revisited , 
23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 407, 457 (1988). 
 119. Id. at 461. 
 120. See Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the 
Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance? , 48 EMORY L.J. 871, 932-33 (1999). 
 121. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 471 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 483 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (1967). 
 122. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
 123. See infra  note 207 and accompanying text. 
 124. Bernard Wolfman, Bosch, Its Implications and Aftermath: The Effect of State Court 
Adjudications on Federal Tax Litigation, 3 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN . 2-1 (1969). 
 125. See, e.g., Elliott K. Braverman & Mervyn S. Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court 
Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 17 TAX L. REV. 545 (1962); Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., Bosch and 
Other Dilemmas: Binding the Parties and the Tax Consequences in Trust Dispute Resolution, 18 U. 
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approach as the best way to guarantee a measure of federal court 
involvement in the state law question short of the wholesale federalization of 
state law determinations seen under the Bosch “proper regard” rubric: state 
court adjudications “should not be accepted as determinative for federal tax 
purposes when the state court proceeding does not appear to have compelled 
the state court to resolve the issue with the full exploration and consideration 
of conflicting viewpoints ordinarily required in adversary proceedings.”126 
This approach is misguided for several reasons. 
As explained earlier,127 the federal courts in the pre-Bosch period were 
unable to agree on the set of relevant factors to determine whether the state 
court proceeding was sufficiently adversarial so as to bind the federal court. 
Although Justices Harlan and Fortas tried to supply such a list in their Bosch 
dissents, any such effort is doomed to fail because of the inherent 
nonadversarial nature of most of the state court proceedings at issue in 
subsequent federal tax litigation. 128  
Moreover, giving controlling status only to adversarial state court 
proceedings encourages the taxpayer’s counsel to engage in elaborate “pillow 
fights” and other machinations designed to produce the requisite adversity.129 
The adversarial approach is fundamentally flawed because it generates 
controversy and litigation over a peripheral issue rather than what should be 
the focus of the inquiry: the correctness of the state court’s application of 
state law. As I have noted elsewhere, why should a state court’s erroneous 
application of state law control the federal tax result merely because the state 
proceeding “was cloaked with sufficient indicia of adversariness?”130 
Professor Wolfman took me to task for “ignor[ing] the fact that it is always 
the business of courts, particularly federal courts deciding tax cases, to look 
under cloaks, to see through even elaborate facades to the structure (or the 
 
 
MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN . 9-1 (1984); David G. Sacks, The Binding Effect of Nontax Litigation in 
State Courts, 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 277 (1963). See also  PAUL R. MCDANIEL,  JAMES R. 
REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 89-90 (4th ed. 1999). 
 126. Wolfman, supra note 124, at 2-25. See also  Bernard Wolfman, Bosch Revisited, 64 TAX 
NOTES 269 (1994) (“For me, some degree of adversariness is essential before a federal court sitting on 
a tax case should be required to accept what a state court has said.”). 
 127. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1978) (Duniway, J., 
concurring) (“[I]n California, and I suspect in most other states, probate proceedings are essentially ex 
parte in character.”); Verbit, supra  note 118, at 454 (“The fundamental difficulty with Freuler/Blair, 
even with the more operational gloss by Justices Harlan and Fortas, is that the usual state court 
proceeding the federal court is asked to embrace is, by design, a non-adversary proceeding.”). 
 129. See Gans, supra  note 120, at 932-33. 
 130. Caron, The Allure of Adversariness, supra note 13, at 673-74 (quoting Caron, The Role of 
State Court Decisions, supra  note 13, at 844). 
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lack of structure) that lies behind.”131 Substance-over-form considerations 
undeniably are endemic in the tax law,132 but there is simply no reason to lard 
yet another tax area with these uncertainties when there is a better alternative 
described in Part D of this section.133 
C. Procedural Devices 
The Bosch “proper regard” standard and the “total regard” and adversarial 
approaches thus do not adequately protect federal and state interests in giving 
effect to state court decisions in federal tax litigation. This section examines 
procedural devices such as certification and joinder and concludes that they 
too fail to protect these interests. 
1. Certification 
One way to obviate the thorny issue of the degree of federal deference 
owed to lower state court determinations of state law is to have the federal 
court certify the state law issue to the highest court in the state.134 Under Erie , 
decisions of the highest state court would be controlling in the federal tax 
litigation.135 Certification thus would protect the federal revenue interest in 
 
 
 131. Wolfman, supra note 14, at 967. 
 132. See generally  1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME , 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.3 (3d ed. 1999); Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in 
Subchapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457 (1999); Robert Willens, Form and Substance in Subchapter C—
Exposing the Myth , 84 TAX NOTES 739 (1999). 
 133. See infra  notes 164-230 and accompanying text. Martin Fried also has criticized the 
adversarial approach for its over-emphasis on the form of the state court proceeding. Martin L. Fried, 
A New Voice in the Debate over the “Ascertainment” of State Law, 71 TAX NOTES 543 (1996); Martin 
L. Fried, Adverseness, Not Adversariness, 64 TAX NOTES 971 (1994); Martin L. Fried, External 
Pressures on Internal Revenue: The Effect of State Court Adjudications in Tax Litigation , 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 647 (1967). However, his alternative approach of focusing on whether the parties to the state 
court litigation were economically adverse suffers from the other failings of the adversarial approach. 
The result under either approach is controversy and litigation over subsidiary issues (adversariness or 
economic adverseness) rather than the central issue of the correctness of the state court decision under 
state law. 
 134. See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4248 (2d ed. 1988). 
 135. In Massachusetts and other states, taxpayers can obtain expedited consideration by the 
highest state court of a state law question that bears on a federal tax issue. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
215, § 13 (West 2000) (probate court may certify question of state law to intermediate appellate court); 
id. ch. 211A, § 10(A) (highest state court may bypass intermediate appellate court in certain 
circumstances and decide certified questions of state law). See, e.g., Berman v. Sandler, 399 N.E.2d 
17, 19 (Mass. 1980) (“It is appropriate for us to render a decision in this case . . . because only an 
interpretive decision by the highest State court will dispose of contrary interpretations by the Internal 
Revenue Service.”); John H. Clymer & Deborah S. Kay, Kirchick v. Guerry: A Yellow Flag , BOSTON 
BAR J. Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 16; Verbit, supra  note 118, at 449-51. 
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obtaining the highest state court’s imprimatur on the state law interpretation 
while preventing needless federal intrusion into the state law 
determination.136 However, several procedural obstacles prevent widespread 
use of certification in federal tax litigation involving questions of state law.137 
Forty-six states (and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) now 
accept inter-jurisdictional certified questions of state law.138 In addition, the 
Supreme Court,139 other federal judges,140 law reform groups,141 and 
commentators142 endorse the practice. However, use of certification is not 
mandatory and instead lies within the discretion of the federal court.143 
 
 
 136. Certification would be desirable given the federal courts’ inability to correctly gauge state 
law in the Erie context. See supra  note 89. 
 137. For one of the few tax cases employing certification in the Bosch context, see Gaskill v. 
United States, No. 83-1433, Slip. Op. (10th Cir., May 20, 1985) (certifying question of Kansas law to 
Kansas Supreme Court); Gaskill v. United States, 708 P.2d 552 (Kan. 1985) (decision of Kansas 
Supreme Court on certified question of Kansas law); Gaskill v. United States, 787 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 
1986) (per curiam) (resolving federal tax issue that turned on application of Kansas law). 
 138. See Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified 
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 373 (2000); M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer 
Came There None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 
WAYNE L. REV. 273, 275 & n.1 (1995); Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting 
Federalism: The Need for an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina , 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 2123, 2129-30 (1999). The four stat es that do not accept certification of state law questions 
are Arkansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 29 (1999); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
520 U.S. 43, 79-80 (1997); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1988); Elkins, 
President, Univ. of Md. v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 668-69 (1978); cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914, 915 (2000) (refusing to certify question regarding interpretation of Nebraska’s partial-birth 
abortion statute because Attorney General had not sought certification, statute was not susceptible to 
narrowing construction, and state answer to question would not have been determinative in federal 
litigation). 
 140. See, e.g., John D. Butzner, Jr. & Mary Nash Kelly, Foreward to Fourth Circuit Review: 
Certification: Assuring the Primacy of State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 
(1985); William J. Holloway, Jr., Certifying Questions to State Supreme Courts, in THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY  93 (Federal Judicial Center 1989). 
 141. See, e.g., ABA JUD. ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.33(c) 
(1977); AMER.  LAW INST. ,  STUDY OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 1371(e) 1969; JONA GOLDSCHMIDT,  AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY , STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE (1995); JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 32-33 (Dec. 
1995); UNIF.  CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 67 
(1996); UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT (1967), 12 U.L.A. 81 (1996). 
 142. For a list of the “voluminous” favorable scholarly commentary on certification, see Peter 
Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress’s Power to Direct State Judicial 
Action: Congress’s Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 
CONN . L. REV. 649, 657-58 & nn.53-54 (1999). 
 143. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (footnote omitted) (“We do 
not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where certification procedure is available, 
resort to it is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps 
build a cooperative judicial federalism. Its use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the 
federal court.”); Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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Moreover, many state certification procedures provide various limitations on 
the types of questions they will answer,144 do not permit certification from 
federal trial courts,145 and retain discretion to refuse to answer particular 
questions.146 In addition, a growing number of judges147 and commentators148 
question the desirability of the widespread use of certification. In any event, 
any attempt to make certification mandatory would raise serious 
constitutional concerns.149 But the foremost barrier to the routine use of 
certification in the Bosch context is that most of the fact-bound state law 
questions at issue in federal tax litigation are not appropriate candidates for 
certification.150 As the Seventh Circuit observed, “fact specific, particularized 
decisions that lack broad, general significance are not suitable for 
certification to a state’s highest court.”151 
 
 
 144. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful 
State Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888 (1971); Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of 
Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform , 18 J. LEGIS. 127 (1992). 
 145. See, e.g., GOLDSCHMIDT, supra  note 141, at 15-18. See also  Estate of German v. United 
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 641, 645-46 (1985) (citation omitted) (“The most satisfactory resolution of this 
question of state law would have been by certification to the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
Unfortunately, . . . [Maryland law] does not allow certification from this court.”). 
 146. See, e.g., GOLDSCHMIDT, supra  note 141, at 20-21. See also  Kaye & Weissman, supra note 
138, at 397 (New York Court of Appeals has refused to answer only five of forty-five questions 
certified to it); Schneider, supra  note 138, at 316-22 (states in the Sixth Circuit refused to answer 
twelve of thirty-two questions certified to them). 
 147. See, e.g., L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (D. Conn. 
1986) (Cabranes, J.) (“It would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary burden on [a state supreme 
court] if the certification process were to be invoked routinely whenever a federal court was presented 
with an unsettled question of [state] law.”); Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question 
.  . ., 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 691 (1995) (“The practice of certification has been plagued by 
theoretical and practical difficulties since its inception. Federal courts evince no clear understanding of 
when, how, or even why to certify questions, and state courts remain anxiously ambivalent about how, 
or even whether, to respond.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification , 47 
ARK.  L.  REV. 305, 359 (1994) (“Although recent trends indicate a move to a greater use of 
certification, this is not an altogether wholesome development . . . .”). 
 149. See Smith, supra note 142. 
 150. For a detailed description of the fact -bound nature of federal tax litigation in the federal 
courts of appeals raising state law issues, see Paul L. Caron, The Federal Courts of Appeals’ Use of 
State Court Decisions in Tax Cases: “Proper Regard” Means “No Regard,” 46 OKLA . L. REV. 443 
(1993).  
 151. Woodbridge Place Apts. v. Washington Square Capital, Inc., 965 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 
1992). See also  Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equip. Mfg. Co., 80 F.3d 136, 137 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(certification not appropriate where state law issue is “case specific, responding to unique factual 
circumstances”); Baker v. America’s Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 58 F.3d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“There may be difficulties in applying Illinois law to the particular facts of a case, but those are not 
problems which the certification procedure is intended to address.”) 
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2. Joinder 
Commentators who advocate a return to the complete-deference152 and 
adversariness153 approaches couple these standards with a requirement that 
the Service be given notice of, and the opportunity to appear in, the state 
court proceeding. Indeed, joinder of the Service as a party in the state court 
proceeding would serve both the revenue and comity interests.154 Joinder 
would allow the Service to litigate the state law issue in state court, but then 
res judicata and collateral estoppel principles would bar it from re-litigating 
the issue in federal court. However, there are both practical and theoretical 
difficulties in joining the Service as a party in the state court proceeding. 
The Service’s long-standing policy is not to appear in state court litigation 
involving state law issues that may bear on the taxpayer’s federal tax 
liability.155 The Internal Revenue Manual156 sets forth specific guidelines for 
dealing with state court litigation “[i]n a Bosch type of case”:157 the Service 
will not respond to notice about the state court action,158 will decline attempts 
by the taxpayer to have the Service intervene in the state court action,159 will 
decline service of process in the state court action,160 and will seek to have 
itself dismissed as a party if it is successfully served in the state court 
proceeding.161 
The Service’s reluctance to appear in state court is understandable in the 
context of most state court proceedings vis-à-vis the later federal tax 
proceeding. At the time of the state court litigation, the federal tax issues 
often have not yet ripened. In the estate tax context of Bosch litigation, the 
state law issues are decided in state probate proceedings, which typically 
 
 
 152. See Verbit, supra  note 118, at 457 n.245. 
 153. See Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions, supra  note 13, at 844 n.297. 
 154. My thanks to Michael Kelly for forcefully pressing the case for joinder of the Service in the 
Bosch context. 
 155. For some of the few appearances by the Service in a state court proceeding, see In re Estate 
of Benson, 285 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1972); In re Estate of Merrick, 275 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1971). For examples of 
the more common situation where the Service declines to participate in the state court proceeding, see 
Dana v. Gring, 371 N.E.2d 755, 756 (Mass. 1977); Babson v. Babson, 371 N.E.2d 430, 431 (Mass. 
1977); Worcester County Nat’l Bank v. King, 268 N.E.2d 838, 839 (Mass. 1971). 
 156. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (2000). 
 157. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c) (“Certain guidelines have been established to determine what course of 
action the United States should take when the Internal Revenue Service is erroneously named as a 
party defendant in a state court proceeding concerning a tax issue, and when intervention in the 
proceeding by the United States is unnecessary or undesirable.”). 
 158. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c)(1). 
 159. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c)(2). 
 160. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c)(3). 
 161. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c)(4). If it is improperly served, the Service will move for dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds. Id. ch. 34, § 790(4)(c)(5). 
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occur before audit of the federal estate tax return. It is unrealistic to expect 
the Service to appear in state court and anticipate the impact of all state law 
issues on the eventual federal tax controversy. In light of the Service’s 
declining ability to police tax compliance,162 it does not make sense to devote 
the Service’s limited resources to state court litigation where, as the next 
section of this Article explains, subsequent federal proceedings can more 
efficiently protect the Service’s revenue interest while furthering the comity 
interest as well. Indeed, over forty years ago two commentators suggested 
that those who support the Service’s participation in state court litigation 
“assume that, if the Commissioner is an uninvited guest at a family gathering, 
he can be made to wash the dishes.”163 
D. A Return to Erie  Principles 
As noted earlier,164 the Court in Bosch explicitly relied on the Erie 
doctrine as the foundation for the “proper regard” test.165 Indeed, it is well-
settled that although the Erie  doctrine arose in the diversity context, it also 
operates in nondiversity cases whenever federal law incorporates state law as 
the applicable rule of decision. 166 Courts and commentators have gone awry 
in failing to give sufficient weight to the Erie  underpinnings of the Bosch 
“proper regard” standard. 
The Court has consistently identified the “twin aims of the Erie rule: 
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of the inequitable 
administration of the [state’s] laws.”167 The current practice of federal courts 
giving mere lip service to the Bosch “proper regard” standard in concluding 
in over one-half of the cases that the state court judge had misapplied state 
law contravenes both of these aims. This failure to adhere to the Bush v. Gore 
deference principle discourages the use of state courts to resolve issues of 
state law and undermines the ability of state courts to administer the laws of 
 
 
 162. See, e.g., Christopher Bergin, IRS Audit Rate Takes Another Dramatic Drop , 90 TAX NOTES 
982 (2001) (current audit rate of .49% is lowest in recent memory). 
 163. Stephens & Freeland, supra  note 23, at 250. 
 164. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 165. The Fifth Circuit recently confirmed that “the Supreme Court laid down an essentially Erie-
based approach to the analysis of state court adjudications of state law questions that have occurred in 
prior aspects of a federal tax case.” Estate of Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999). 
 166. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 n.13 (1983) (“[W]here 
Congress directly or impliedly  directs the courts to look to state law to fill in details of federal law, 
Erie will ordinarily provide the framework for doing so.”). See generally Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. 
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity? , 78 MICH . L. REV. 311 (1980). 
 167. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). See also  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 
518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988). 
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the state. 
Mitchell Gans argues that Erie  simply is “not relevant” in the Bosch 
situation.168 According to Professor Gans, concerns about forum shopping 
are misplaced because “federal tax disputes are resolved only in the federal 
courts.”169 But where the federal tax result turns on the application of state 
law, the choice of whether to litigate the state law issue in state or federal 
court is undeniably affected by the degree of deference afforded the state 
court determination by a federal court. Professor Gans also contends that 
Bosch’s reliance on Erie cannot be justified 
by a concern about federal courts trampling on state law: a federal 
court resolving a tax dispute does not, by determining a state-law issue 
in the course of reaching its ultimate tax conclusion, trample upon 
state law in the same way that a federal court exercising diversity 
jurisdiction might were it permitted to disregard state-court 
decisions.170  
But as explained below, the different procedural postures of the typical Erie 
and Bosch cases suggest that there is a greater violation of the Bush v. Gore 
comity concern when federal courts trample upon state law in federal tax 
litigation.171 
The proper resolution of this nettlesome issue of tax law thus should 
accommodate the procedural differences between the garden-variety Erie and 
Bosch cases.172 In the traditional Erie diversity case, the question is the 
weight to be afforded in the federal proceeding to state law determinations by 
lower state courts in cases involving other parties. In contrast, in the typical 
Bosch tax case, the question is the weight to be afforded in the federal 
proceeding to a state law determination by a lower state court in a case 
involving the taxpayer. Implementation of the Bush v. Gore deference 
principles requires a careful consideration of the competing revenue and 
comity interests. 
On the one hand, the revenue interest supports giving less deference to 
prevent the taxpayer from manipulating the state proceeding to obtain a state 
law ruling with favorable federal tax consequences not otherwise permitted 
under state law. On the other hand, the comity interest supports giving more 
 
 
 168. Gans, supra note 120, at 891 n.83. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Bernard Wolfman criticizes the Court in Bosch for “its simplistic, forcible co-opting of Erie 
doctrine.” Wolfman, supra  note 124, at 2-6. Professor Wolfman argues that the differences between 
the Erie and Bosch contexts support a return to the adversariness approach. Id. at 2-7 to 2-8. 
 172. See Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions, supra  note 13, at 844-52. 
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deference to avoid having the federal court render a state law determination 
contrary to that of the state court on the same facts involving the same 
taxpayer. The best way to balance the twin Erie goals, the Bush v. Gore 
deference principle, and the revenue and comity interests is to heed the 
Court’s direction in Bosch that in applying the “proper regard” standard, 
federal courts must “in effect, sit[] as a state court.”173 
Traditional Erie doctrine employs a “top-down” analysis by predicting 
how the highest state court would decide the state law issue. However, when 
the federal courts “sit as a state court” in a Bosch tax situation, they should 
use a “bottom-up” Erie analysis by giving the same deference to the lower 
state court’s decision as it would receive on appeal in the state court 
system.174 There is support for this approach in recent Erie jurisprudence as 
well as in a recent Tax Court case applying Bosch.175 
One current Erie controversy concerns a dispute among federal district 
judges in Illinois over the proper application of Erie  in the face of conflicting 
decisions by the Illinois intermediate appellate court. Under Illinois law, 
decisions of the state intermediate appellate court’s five districts are treated 
as binding only on the state trial courts within each district.176 Some federal 
district judges apply a traditional Erie analysis and predict how the Illinois 
Supreme Court would decide the case. Under this “top-down” approach, the 
federal court in a diversity case gives no special deference to any of the 
conflicting intermediate state appellate court decisions.177 Other federal 
district judges consider themselves bound by an intermediate appellate court 
decision from the district within which the federal judge sits. Under this 
“bottom-up” approach, the federal court gives effect to the geographic reach 
 
 
 173. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465. 
 174. In states with an intermediate appellate court between the trial court and the highest court in 
the state, this approach would apply the same standard of review to a trial court’s decision as would be 
employed on appeal by the intermediate appellate court. In states without an intermediate appellate 
court, this approach would apply the same standard of review to a trial court’s decision as would be 
employed on appeal by the highest court of the state.  
 175. Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 (1994). 
 176. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill. 1988); Sidwell v. Griggsville Cmty. Sch. 
Dist. 4, 566 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Bradshaw v. Pellican, 504 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1987); Taylor Mattis & Kenneth G. Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [sic] the Appellate Court of 
Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 573, 578-81 (1979). In addition, if only one district of the 
intermediate appellate court has decided a state law issue, a trial court located in another appellate 
district is bound by that decision. See, e.g., People v. Thorpe, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).  
 177. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986-87 (N.D. Ill. 
1999); Murry v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052, 1053-54 & 1054 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Applied Micro, 
Inc. v. SJI Fulfillment, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 750, 755-56 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Roberts v. Western-Southern 
Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 538-45 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 643-45 
(N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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of the precedential effect of the intermediate state appellate court’s 
decisions.178 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently stated that 
the issue of whether the federal courts should be bound by the 
decisions of the intermediate state appellate court to which the case 
would have been appealed had it been litigated in a state trial court is a 
recurrent one and we might as well lay it to rest and put the 
contending distric t judges out of their misery.179 
Judge Posner championed the “top-down” Erie  approach,180 stating that 
“we can do no better than to fall back on the familiar rule, clearly articulated 
in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, that decisions by intermediate state 
appellate courts are not authoritative in federal court.”181 According to Judge 
Posner, “[t]he federal court is to imagine itself the state supreme court rather 
than an intermediate court of the state.”182 In an earlier article,183 Geri 
Yonover agreed that the “top-down” approach is more consistent with Erie 
principles.184 Like Judge Posner, Professor Yonover based her argument on 
Bosch in concluding that the “top-down” approach avoided having the 
federal court apply “a rule different from that which would ultimately be 
applied in state court.”185 Although Chief Judge Posner and Professor 
Yonover correctly conclude that the “top-down” approach better 
accommodates Erie  in the non-Bosch setting where there was no prior state 
court litigation involving the parties, the “bottom-up” approach better serves 
Erie  principles where the taxpayer was a party in the prior state court 
litigation. 
In the Bosch situation, federal courts should give the same deference to 
the lower state court decision as would be given to it on appeal in the state 
 
 
 178. See, e.g., Systemax, Inc. v. Schoff, 972 F. Supp. 439, 441-43 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Integrated 
Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Commercial Bank of China, 757 F. Supp. 938, 944 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 
1991); CNC Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. CNC Serv. Ctr., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 293, 297-98 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Abbott 
Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 196-99 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
 179. Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 674 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). 
 180. In contrast, the panel majority deferred to the district judge’s choice of the bottom-up Erie 
approach. Id. at 666. Judge Posner correctly noted in dissent that under Salve Regina College v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991), federal courts of appeals are not permitted to defer to district courts’ 
interpretations of state law. 192 F.3d at 674 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). See also  Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 
U.S. 137, 145 (1996) (Supreme Court does not defer to federal court of appeals’ interpretations of state 
law). 
 181. 192 F.3d at 675 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Geri B. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1 (1989). 
 184. Id. at 31-42. 
 185. Id. at 37. 
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court system. This approach is necessary to prevent a result that a litigant 
could not have obtained had the lower state court’s decision been appealed in 
the state court system.186 The proposed “bottom-up” approach will 
implement the Bush v. Gore deference principle and result in more deference 
being given by federal courts to state court determinations of state law than is 
currently the case under the Bosch “proper regard” standard. Although the 
precise standard of review will depend on the applicable state law in a given 
situation, very few of the cases that have invoked Bosch over the past thirty-
four years have presented pure questions of law subject to de novo review in 
the state appellate court. Instead, most of the cases have involved either pure 
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law where the state appellate 
courts would employ a more deferential “clearly erroneous” or “abuse of 
discretion” standard of review. 
For example, in Estate of Goree v. Commissioner,187 the decedent died 
intestate in an airplane crash, survived by his wife and three minor 
children.188 The principal asset of the estate was $3.9 million of stock in a 
single corporation. Decedent’s father was appointed administrator of the 
estate, and his wife was appointed conservator of the estates of their 
children.189 Under Alabama’s intestacy statute,190 one-half of the estate was 
to be distributed to decedent’s wife and the other one-half divided among the 
three children, resulting in significant estate tax liability.191 To prevent these 
adverse tax consequences, decedent’s wife petitioned the Alabama Probate 
Court to enter protective orders authorizing each child to execute partial 
disclaimers renouncing any interest in their father’s estate in excess of 
$200,000. 192 The plan thus was to defer the estate tax by having a total of 
 
 
 186. Cf. People's Bank of Polk County v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam) (facin g conflicting decisions of different districts of state intermediate appellate court, 
Eleventh Circuit followed decision of court that “would have reviewed this case had it been brought in 
state court”); Farmer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 539 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (where state court 
action would have been reviewed by state intermediate appellate court that had taken position contrary 
to plaintiff’s in another case, Fifth Circuit refused to circumvent intermediate appellate court’s 
decision by certifyin g question to highest court of state; instead, Fifth Circuit applied same state law 
“as would have been applied in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system” and did not 
“permit a party, by choosing a federal over a state forum, to get the [state] Supreme Court's attention 
through this Court to issues which that Court has refused to accept from state litigants”). 
 187. 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 (1994). As will be seen, this Article focuses on the Goree case because 
of its important contribution to unraveling the Bosch conundrum, not because of the similarity of its 
name to one of the parties in Bush v. Gore. 
 188. See Caron, supra  note 14, at 231-33. 
 189. 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 124. 
 190. ALA. CODE §§ 43-8-40 to 43-8-58 (1991). 
 191. 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 124. 
 192. Id. 
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$600,000 pass to the three children to use up the father’s unified credit,193 
with the remaining assets passing to the wife under the Alabama intestacy 
statute to qualify for the marital deduction.194 The Alabama Probate Court 
appointed a guardian ad litem for the children and, after a hearing, approved 
the disclaimers as being in the best interests of the children under the relevant 
Alabama statute.195 
The Service disallowed the estate’s claimed marital deduction on the 
ground that the Alabama Probate Court had misapplied the best interests of 
the children standard in approving the disclaimers.196 The Service contended 
that the Tax Court should give no deference to the Alabama Probate Court’s 
decision and instead conduct a de novo review to determine whether the 
disclaimers were in the best interests of the children under Alabama law.197 
In a memorandum decision, the Tax Court refused to eviscerate Bosch and 
instead applied the same standard of review that the Alabama Supreme Court 
would have used had the Alabama Probate Court’s decision been appealed in 
the state court system.198 
Although the lack of a record or transcript of the Alabama Probate Court 
hearing hampered the Tax Court,199 the estate presented as witnesses at trial 
in the Tax Court all of the parties to the probate proceeding,200 as well as the 
Alabama probate judge.201 After hearing these witnesses, the Tax Court held 
that the Alabama Probate Court’s determination that the disclaimers were in 
the best interests of the children was not “plainly and palpably erroneous” 
under Alabama law.202 The Tax Court rejected the Service’s argument that 
the wife’s sole motive in seeking approval of the disclaimers was to eliminate 
the estate tax liability. Although tax considerations clearly were present, the 
Tax Court pointed to nontax factors, such as the desire to preserve capital and 
 
 
 193. At the time of the Goree case, the unified credit sheltered $600,000 from tax. Under current 
law, the credit shelters $675,000 from tax, and this amount is scheduled to rise to $1 million in 2002 
and in several increments to $3.5 million in 2009, followed by the repeal of the estate tax in 2010 (and 
its subsequent return in 2011). Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 521, 115 Stat. 71 (2001) (to be codified at I.R.C. 2010(c)); id. § 901 (sunset provision). 
 194. I.R.C. § 2056 (1994).  
 195. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-136(c) (1991). 
 196. 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 128. 
 197. Id. at 126. 
 198. Id. at 127 (“To decide whether the highest court of Alabama would decide contrary to the 
Probate Court judge’s decision in the instant case, we will consider the standard of review that the 
Alabama Supreme Court would use to review the Probate Court judge’s decision.”). 
 199. Id. at 127 n.9. 
 200. Id. at 127-28. The father-administrator, the wife-conservator, and the children’s guardian all 
testified in the Tax Court proceeding. Id.  
 201. Id. at 127. 
 202. Id. at 128. 
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fulfill the decedent’s wishes to keep the stock within the family and the 
likelihood that the children would receive large inheritances upon the deaths 
of other elderly family members.203 
The Service announced that it would not acquiesce in the Goree decision 
on the ground that “the Tax Court erred in applying an appellate standard of 
review to a lower state court factual determination instead of reviewing the 
question de novo.”204 The accompanying Action on Decision,205 however, is 
much broader. The Service argued that the Tax Court “misapplied” Bosch 
because “[t]he cases it cited in support are all distinguishable in that they 
concern the extent to which lower state court legal determinations are 
binding on the Tax Court, not factual determinations.”206 This fixation on the 
distinction between legal and factual determinations misses the mark. Goree 
is the typical Bosch case in that it involves a state court factual determination 
that would receive great deference by state appellate courts under the 
“plainly and palpably erroneous” standard of review. In contrast, state 
appellate courts only apply the de novo standard of review proposed by the 
Service to pure questions of state law that are quite rare in the Bosch context. 
Under the Service’s approach, federal courts would give no deference to state 
court proceedings that lack the requisite degree of adversariness.207 As I have 
 
 
 203. Id. In an interesting postscript to the case, the estate petitioned the Tax Court to assess 
attorneys’ fees against the Service under I.R.C. § 7430. The estate contended that the Service’s 
position was not “substantially justified” within the meaning of § 7430 because the Service had 
misinterpreted Bosch in arguing that the Tax Court was required to make a de novo determination of 
state law. The Tax Co urt rejected the attorneys’ fees request, but only because of the lack of a state 
court record; the Tax Court implied that had such a record existed, the Service’s argument for de novo 
review would not have been “substantially justified”: 
Respondent’s position in the instant proceeding was reasonable, especially in light of the fact that 
no record or transcript of the Probate Court proceeding was maintained. Although we held in our 
prior opinion that Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, supra , did not necessarily require us to review 
the Probate Court proceeding de novo, we conclude that petitioner would not have satisfied its 
burden of proof in the absence of a record or other evidence of what transpired in the Probate 
Court proceeding. Had petitioner not offered the testimony of those persons who participated in 
the Probate Court proceeding at trial, we would not have had a record from which we could decide 
whether the Probate Court judge’s decision to permit the partial disclaimers was plainly and 
palpably erroneous. We think that even the Supreme Court of Alabama, had it been required to 
review the Probate Court judge’s decision, would have remanded the case to the lower court to 
make a record sufficient for it to review. Respondent’s position in the instant case was reasonable, 
taking into account the fact that there was no record to support petitioner’s position that the 
Probate Court judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the disclaimers by decedent’s minor 
children. Consequently, we hold that respondent’s position was substantially justified.  
Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1068, 1069 (1994). 
 204. 1996-2 C.B. 1 n.10. 
 205. Action on Dec. 1996-001 (Mar. 4, 1996), 1996 WL 89733. 
 206. Id., 1996 WL 89733. 
 207. The Service quoted the Supreme Court’s rationale for a deferential standard of appellate 
review of factual findings in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985): “[T]he trial on the 
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argued elsewhere, the Service’s Action on Decision “amounts to a virtual 
nonacquiescence [to] Bosch itself.”208 
Although there is some support for the “bottom-up” approach of Goree in 
prior 209 and subsequent cases,210 as a memorandum decision it has not been 
followed by subsequent Tax Court decisions211 or been widely embraced by 
 
 
merits should be the ‘main event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’” Id. According to the Service, 
the nonadversarial nature of the Alabama Probate Court’s proceeding destroyed the justification for 
such deferential review: 
[T]he situation that prompted the rule in Estate of Bosch did not involve an adversarial “main 
event,” but the opposite extreme of possible collusion between the parties. Similarly, in this case, 
there was doubt as to the adversarial nature of the state court proceeding, and as to the extent of 
testimonial evidence available to the trier of fact. In addition, there was no factual record available 
for review; the Tax Court was required to make its own but then reviewed the state court 
conclusions of fact based upon this subsequently created record, using an appellate (palpably 
erroneous) standard. The utilization of the palpably erroneous standard for review of factual 
findings in a nonadversarial situation is inconsistent with the rationale for the palpably erroneous 
standard, which assumes a vigorously contested lower court hearing. 
Action on Dec. 1996-001 (Mar. 4, 1996), 1996 WL 89733. 
 208. Caron, supra note 14, at 233. 
 209. See, e.g., Estate of Salter v. Comm’r, 545 F.2d 494, 499-500 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal court 
must determine whether highest court of state “would have affirmed the [state court’s] decree had 
there been an appeal"); Greene v. United States, 476 F.2d 117, 119 (7th Cir. 1973) (federal court must 
determine whether state “Supreme Court would have decided the case differently if there had been a 
party who had taken an appeal”); Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1969) 
(federal court must determine whether highest court of state “would have affirmed the action of the 
probate court”); Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 382 F.2d 295, 295 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (highest 
state court “would not follow the decision of the [state court]”); Harrah v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 735, 754 
(1978) (highest court in state “would have approved the action by the [lower state] court had it been 
called upon to review it”). However, as Professor Verbit has observed, the “courts adopting this view 
do not seem to have given much attention to the standard of review the relevant state supreme court 
would have applied in reviewing the lower court decision.” Verbit, supra  note 118, at 442 n.188. 
 210. See Estate of O’Neal v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1216-17 (N.D. Ala. 1999). See 
also  Estate of Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995, 1001 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1072 (1999); Estate of DePaoli v. Comm’r,  62 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995); Estate of Pruitt v. 
Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 348, 354 (2000). 
 211. See Estate of Young v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 297, 300-06 (1998); Estate of Bond v. Comm’r, 
104 T.C. 652, 657 n.3 (1995); Estate of Lassiter v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 541, 551-57 (2000); 
Steingold v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 95, 96 (2000); Estate of Chamberlain, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 
2080, 2085-88 (1999); Estate of Horstmeier v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1940, 1942-45 (1999), aff’d 
sub. nom , Scott v. Comm’r, 226 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of Davenport v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 405, 410-12 (1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 1999); Estate of Baird v. Comm’r, 73 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1883, 1884-86 (1997); Estate of Street v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1787, 1788-89 
(1997), aff’d on other grounds, 152 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1998); Estate of Kenly v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1314, 1317-19 (1996), aff’d mem., 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998); Zurn v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 440, 449-50 (1996); Estate of Rapp v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1709, 1715-19 (1996), aff’d , 
140 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1998); Wells v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1278, 1280-82 (1995); Estate of 
Millikin v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3032, 3036-37 (1995), vacated, 125 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(en banc); Estate of Tenenbaum v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1787, 1788 (1995), rev’d, 112 F.3d 251 
(6th Cir. 1997); McDonald v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1400, 1408-09 (1994), aff’d mem., 114 F.3d 
1194 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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other commentators.212 Yet it offers the best balance of the twin Erie goals of 
eliminating forum shopping and ensuring effective state court administration 
of state law. Where, as in Goree, the state appellate court would apply a 
deferential standard in reviewing the lower state court’s application of state 
law, the federal court should similarly circumscribe its review of the lower 
state court’s decision. Under this approach, the federal court is not free, as is 
the existing practice under the “proper regard” standard, to disregard the state 
court’s decision and conduct a plenary review of state law. In contrast, a 
“top-down” approach, which focuses on predicting how the highest state 
court would decide the case, would provide review not otherwise available in 
the state court system. This “top-down” approach would interfere with the 
Erie  goal of obtaining the same result in the federal system to minimize 
forum shopping incentives and preserve the state courts’ role in 
administering the laws of the state. 
At first blush, Goree’s adoption of the state law standard of appellate 
review appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent embrace, in the 
diversity context, of a federal standard of appellate review. In Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc.,213 the New York legislature had enacted a 
statute requiring that state intermediate appellate courts determine whether a 
jury award was excessive based on whether it “deviates materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation.”214 The New York courts had extended 
this standard to the state’s trial courts as well.215 The issue was whether 
federal courts in a diversity action should use this New York standard or the 
more deferential federal standard.216 The Court balanced the respective state 
interest (to rein in excessive jury awards) and federal interest (to preserve the 
jury’s role as decisionmaker under the Seventh Amendment) and reached 
different conclusions with respect to the applicable standard to be applied by 
the federal district court and the federal court of appeals.217 
The Court held that a federal district court should apply the state’s more 
restrictive standard for trial court review of a jury’s verdict, rather than the 
more deferential federal standard (“shock the conscience”).218 According to 
 
 
 212. The leading tax treatise first cites the Bosch “proper regard” test and then the Goree bottom-
up approach, but concludes that “the lower courts have not always been blind to relationships among 
the litigants in the state court proceedings or the presence of federal tax motives for those 
proceedings.” 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, supra note 132, at 4-15 to 4-16. 
 213. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 214. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995). 
 215. 518 U.S. at 425. 
 216. Id. at 422. 
 217. Id. at 457. 
 218. Id. 
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the Court, this was a “false conflict” between the state and federal interests 
because the federal interest could be accommodated by yielding to “New 
York’s dominant interest.”219 In contrast, the Court held that a federal court 
of appeals should apply the more deferential federal standard (abuse of 
discretion) for appellate review of the trial court’s decision, rather than the 
more restrictive state standard. According to the Court, this was a “true 
conflict” and the federal interest trumped the state interest.220 
The second Gasperini holding does not undercut the “bottom-up” Erie 
approach in the Bosch situation. Although the Gasperini Court embraced a 
federal standard of appellate review at the expense of the state standard, the 
Seventh Amendment concerns undergirding the federal interest are absent in 
the Bosch situation because there is no federal constitutional right to jury trial 
in state court.221 Moreover, the state interest is stronger in the federal tax 
litigation context where the taxpayer was a party to the prior state court 
litigation. In this situation, the twin Erie goals, the Bush v. Gore deference 
principle, and the revenue and comity interests all support using the state 
appellate standard of review in deciding the state law question in federal 
court.222 
The “bottom-up” approach best serves the Bosch direction to “sit as a 
state court” by focusing on what actually would have happened had the state 
court system reviewed the lower state court’s decision. In virtually every case 
applying Bosch over the past thirty-four years, the taxpayer has obtained a 
lower state court ruling on state law that would have favorable federal tax 
consequences for the taxpayer if followed in the subsequent federal tax 
litigation. Under current practice, the federal courts greet the taxpayer’s 
“offensive” use of the lower state court decree by giving “no regard” to the 
state court’s application of state law. As a result, the federal courts have run 
 
 
 219. Id. at 437 (New York’s dominant interest can be respected, without disrupting the federal 
system, once it is recognized that the federal district court is capable of performing the checking 
function, i.e., that court can apply the State’s ‘deviates materially’ standard in line with New York case 
law . . . .”). 
 220. Id. at 434-36. 
 221. In addition, most of the state court cases implicating Bosch  are actions before a probate judge 
involving the administration of a decedent’s will. 
 222. In any event, there has been much scholarly criticism of this aspect of Gasperini. See Joseph 
P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1235, 1288 (1999); Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 MISS. L.J. 715, 732-48 (1999); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment 
on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 298-05 (1997); Richard D. Freer, 
Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1657-62 (1998); Wendy 
Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on 
Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 773-74 (1998). 
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roughshod over the Bush v. Gore deference principle in concluding in over 
one-half of the cases that the state court had misapplied state law. In contrast, 
the “bottom-up” approach would give teeth to the “proper regard” standard 
by requiring the federal courts to give the same degree of deference to the 
state court decision that it would have received on appeal in the state court 
system.223 
The current judicial practice of federalizing questions of state law through 
de novo re-examinations of state law decisions is contrary to the long-
standing probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Under this 
“venerable” doctrine,224 the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction does not 
extend to the administration of a decedent’s estate or the probate of a will.225 
The doctrine is based in part on the greater expertise of state judges in 
dealing with these issues compared to their federal counterparts.226 Even 
though most of the Bosch issues arise in the estate administration and probate 
context, federal courts have used the “proper regard” standard to oust their 
state counterparts in interpreting state law.227 
The “bottom-up” approach also accommodates both the revenue and the 
comity concerns. Federal revenue interests are protected by permitting 
meaningful review of the state court’s application of state law. Comity 
concerns are protected by limiting federal review of the state court decision 
to the same standards that would have been applied by the state courts on 
appeal of the original decision. 
The “bottom-up” approach may not strike the ideal balance between 
federal and state  interests in every situation. But the burden in these 
situations is for Congress to re-calibrate the respective roles for federal and 
state law under the particular federal tax provision. For example, Mitchell 
Gans has convincingly argued that various provisions of federal tax law 
either under-emphasize228 or over-emphasize229 state law. He contends that 
 
 
 223. In the rare case where the Service makes “defensive” use of a lower state court determination 
that would have adverse tax consequences for the taxpayer if followed in the subsequent federal tax 
litigation, the bottom-up approach again would require the federal courts to give the same degree of 
deference to the state court decision as it would have received on appeal in the state court system. 
 224. Turja v. Turja, 118 F.3d 1007 (4th Cir. 1997). See also  Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 
(7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) (“The probate exception is one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of 
the law of federal jurisdiction.”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
 225. See, e.g., Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & 
Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909). See generally 13B WRIGHT,  MILLER & COOPER, supra  note 134, 
§ 3610. 
 226. See, e.g., Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 714-15 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1017 (1982). 
 227. See Verbit, supra note 118, at 455-56. See also Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, 
and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994). 
 228. Gans, supra note 120, at 874-75. 
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the Bosch framework has caused an over-reliance on state law in the marital 
deduction area and advocates reform of Code section 2056 that would 
eliminate any role for state law.230 Absent such re-calibration in specific 
situations, the “bottom-up” approach is the best way to balance the twin Erie 
goals, the Bush v. Gore deference principle, and the revenue and comity 
interests. 
CONCLUSION 
For eighty-five years, the federal courts have been unable to agree on how 
much weight should be given in federal tax litigation to a state court’s 
determination of state law. The focus on the general question of federal court 
deference to state court decisions in Bush v. Gore should be directed at 
finally resolving this nettlesome federal tax question. The only approach that 
gives fealty to the Bush v. Gore deference principle, while also furthering the 
goals of the Erie  doctrine and balancing the competing revenue and comity 
interests, is for federal courts to afford the same degree of deference to the 
state court determination as it would have received on appeal in the state 
court system. As a result, federal courts no longer should treat the Bosch 
“proper regard” test as a roving license to second-guess state court 
determinations of state law. Instead, it should take the rare tax equivalent of 
the Bush v. Gore situation to impel a federal court to overturn a state court’s 
application of state law. 
 
 
 229. Id. at 876-83. 
 230. Id. at 933-42. I part company with Professor Gans over his suggestion that a “more modest” 
solution to the marital deduction’s over-emphasis of state law would be for Congress to overrule Bosch 
by statute. Id. at 891 n.83 & 931-33. Since Bosch has widespread impact in the federal tax law beyond 
the marital deduction, overruling the decision to solve a problem with the marital deduction would be 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. Moreover, Professor Gans’ suggestion that Bosch could be 
replaced by having federal courts either giv e complete deference to state court decisions or give 
deference only to state court decisions that are the product of adversarial proceedings ignores the 
inherent difficulties of both of these approaches. See supra  notes 114-33 and accompanying text. 
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